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Abstract  
 Since 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has launched the 
Doha Round that aims to speed up the liberalization of trade policies while 
ensuring for developing countries, in particular the least developed among 
them, a share in the growth of world trade that corresponds to the needs of 
their economic development. However, like many developing countries, the 
Arab countries have ambiguous relationships with the multilateral 
negotiations process, ambiguity that characterizes more generally their 
position within the WTO. The Doha Round has shown the Arab countries’ 
adherence to the virtues of free trade and their desire of deeper integration in 
the multilateral trading system. At the same time, the impact of the Arab 
countries on the conduct of the negotiation process remains low and reflects, 
ultimately, their marginalization in the WTO system. This contribution 
endeavors to analyze the key issues of the Doha Round for Arab countries 
and the reasons of this ambiguity. 
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Introduction 
 The last major reorganization of the multilateral trading system took 
place in 1995 with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which lasted more 
than eight years and which resulted in the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter WTO). 
 At the Fourth Ministerial Conference held in 2001 in Doha (Qatar), 
the WTO members launched a new round of multilateral negotiations called 
"the Doha Development Round", with the goals of reducing trade barriers 
and considering more accurately specific needs of developing countries.  
 Given its ambitious goals, it is not a coincidence that the Doha Round 
includes more than 21 issues for negotiation, even if agriculture and market 
access for non-agricultural products issues are concentrating most offensive 
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and defensive interests of the major actors in the negotiations, with the 
exception perhaps of services. 
 These negotiations, whether the ministerial conferences in Cancun 
(2003), or Hong Kong (2005) or Geneva (2009 and 2011), have however 
resulted in resounding failures. Even the "Bali package", resulting from the 
last ministerial conference held in December 2013 in Bali, did not lead to 
major progress on the sensitive issues mentioned above, advocating only a 
package of measures to boost trade of the least developed countries and to 
ensure better food security for developing countries. This shows how the 
conclusion of the Doha Round remains a daunting task. Indeed, multilateral 
negotiations have clearly highlighted the growing gap among the WTO 
Members, not only between emerging and other developing countries but 
more broadly a North-South division, which questions the basic assumptions 
of the WTO foundations, namely the theory of comparative advantages and 
the automatic link between trade and development. 
 This fracture involves de facto the Arab world. The latter corresponds 
to 22 countries characterized by a circumscribed geographical area ranging 
from the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in the west to Oman in the east, as 
well as by a common Arabic language and Islamic culture resulting from the 
historical expansion of Islam. All these countries belong to the category of 
developing countries, with a special mention for six of them which are part 
of the list of least developed countries (hereinafter LDCs) as defined by the 
United Nations. Among the Arab countries, twelve are already WTO 
members and eight others have observer status and are in the process of 
accession to this organization. 
 This brief presentation hides, nonetheless, another reality. Analyzed 
from a political and economic perspective, the Arab world is far from being 
unitary and homogeneous. While the "Arab Spring" carries as much hope as 
uncertainty, the Arab countries remain outside the mutations and reforms 
that benefit many areas around the world. Until today, the trade obstacles and 
conflicts that cross this region are not allowing it to benefit from the 
advantages of natural and geographical endowments, close to Europe and at 
a pivotal position between Europe, Africa and Asia. This part of the world 
did not yet experience the political and economic dynamics seen in other 
emerging areas (particularly in Latin America, East Asia and Central and 
Eastern Europe). Although the Arab countries have a total population of 
around 360 million, which constitutes about 6% of the world population, 
their share in the world trade is de minimis. To this painful reality, one may 
add the heterogeneity of levels of development and economic structure 
among the Arab countries. As a result, a classification is required. At the risk 
of oversimplifying, three categories of countries emerge: those whose 
economies are mainly based on oil and hydrocarbons exports, and belonging 
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to the category of high-income countries; middle-income countries whose 
economies are mainly based on traditional sectors (agriculture and 
manufacturing) with an increasing share of services; and low-income 
countries with underdeveloped economies based essentially on agriculture. 
The following developments must be imperatively analyzed in the light of 
this diversity. 
 Obviously, the Doha round challenges the Arab States. It reveals both 
their fragility in the multilateral trading system (hereinafter MTS) and the 
contradictions of their handling the liberalization of international trade: 
contradiction between Arab societies crossed by a strong anti-globalization 
movement and the adherence of the Arab leaders to the virtues of liberalism 
and the proclamation of its compatibility with Islam; contradiction between 
the acceptation by these Arab leaders of Doha objectives and their low 
participation in the negotiations process; contradiction between the low 
efficiency of the support and technical assistance offered by the WTO and 
the desire to promote better integration of developing countries in general 
and Arab countries in particular in the MTS; contradiction between the 
desire regularly displayed to grant a privileged place to these countries 
within the WTO bodies and the concrete absence of representation within the 
institution; contradiction between the large number of Arab countries that are 
full or potential members of the WTO and their low share in world trade. 
 And the list is still long about the challenges faced by Arab countries 
in the current MTS. But these arguments are sufficient, we believe, to 
demonstrate the malfunctioning of the MTS within the Doha Round with 
respect to developing countries in general, and with respect to the sustainable 
development of Arab countries in particular. 
 The purpose of this study is therefore to understand precisely the 
reasons of these contradictions and the issues surrounding the Doha Round 
for Arab states. Two ideas will in this respect constitute the backdrop of the 
following arguments. First, it appears that the Arab countries share the belief 
that the outcome of the Doha Round negotiations is crucial for a sustainable 
development and their integration into the globalized economy (1). Second, 
and in an antagonistic and contradictory movement, the Doha Round has 
highlighted the low impact of the Arab countries on the progress of 
multilateral negotiations, a weakness that generally characterizes the position 
of many developing countries in these negotiations and their distrust in the 
functioning of the WTO and its values (2). These arguments will be followed 
by a brief conclusion. 
 
The major impact of the doha round on arab states 
 The willingness of Arab countries to conclude the Doha Round 
negotiations reflects both their adherence to the virtues of free trade within 
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the multilateral framework of the WTO and their desire to promote national 
policies for sustainable development (a), as well as their fear of dangers that 
would result from a failure of the multilateral negotiations (b). 
 
a. The adherence of Arab states to the virtues of free-trade 
 To benefit from the expected advantages of the liberalization of 
international trade, most Arab states have swiftly expressed the desire to join 
the WTO. Consequently, these countries did not hesitate to undertake deep 
economic reforms focused on three main components: privatizations in 
certain sectors such as telecommunications; a policy of open borders with a 
trade liberalization component; and the improvement of the legal business 
environment as reflected by sometimes total amendments of internal 
legislative corpus in order to comply with WTO requirements. These reforms 
have at times looked like a revolution since Arab economies were 
traditionally marked by a strong state footprint and numerous barriers to 
trade and investment. 
 Clearly, Arab leaders continue to proclaim the virtues of free trade 
and thus join the supporters of economic liberalization, who advocate the 
benefits of the opening of borders and gradual elimination of tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers. Liberals maintain that free trade would be a factor for 
peace and interdependence between states, and an absolute postulate to allow 
economic and social progress. As such, free trade is supposed to benefit both 
businesses and consumers, and also ultimately the concerned States. 
Concretely, the optimum efficiency of trade liberalization requires an 
appropriate multilateral framework based on specific mechanisms: 
transparency, non-discrimination that encompasses the WTO principles of 
most favored nation and national treatment, and fairness as expressed in the 
special and differential treatment granted to developing countries. 
 The above-mentioned principles and the institutional framework in 
which they are applied are as relevant today as they were after the Second 
World War and especially at the time of the creation of the WTO in 1995. 
But their effectiveness depends on the inclusion of new global economic 
realities: new types of trade barriers, changing needs of Members, in 
particular the developing countries, etc. The Doha Round is therefore aimed 
at enhancing openness and rebalance trade to stimulate the global economy. 
 For Arab countries, the ideological approach in the Doha process is 
based on two interrelated ideas: first, the need to strengthen the dynamics of 
multilateral liberalization and, secondly, the reorientation of the MTS 
towards their particular sustainable development goals and requirements. 
 In the context of increased liberalization of trade, these countries are 
also seeking to redefine their foreign trade policies. The purpose is to 
diversify their trading partners and reduce dependence of Arab economies 
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vis-à-vis the United States, European and Chinese markets, reflecting trade 
deficits and an imbalance of rights and obligations related to bilateral 
approaches with much more powerful partners. One of the major 
characteristics of trade in Arab countries is that trade with the EU covers 
between 40 and 60% of total trade, while the inter-Arab trade is limited to 
about 10%. Exchanges that Arab countries administer through the WTO do 
not exceed 30 % of the total. While oil exporting Arab countries recorded a 
surplus in their trade balance, most Arab states are exporters of industrial and 
agricultural products and suffer a chronic trade deficit. One may better 
understand, therefore, why the idea of inseparability of free trade and 
multilateralism has widespread defenders in the Arab countries. 
 
b. The risks of failure in the Doha Round 
 In the most likely event where the Doha Development Round is not 
completed or is completed with a minimum agreement that does not address 
the key issues of the negotiations, the magnitude of lost opportunities would 
be significant and the multilateral trading system may be subjected to 
systemic pressures. Developing countries would then be among the main 
losers. Among the negative consequences for these countries, four of them 
deserve special attention: the return to protectionism, the judicialization of 
the WTO, the proliferation of "variable geometry" commitments, and the 
spread of unilateralism in trade. Let us examine these four elements: 
 The first risk is thus protectionism. To justify the current deadlock, 
some Members emphasize the need to protect “domestic jobs” or “domestic 
industries” against international competition which is considered unfair. The 
risk is so great to see the resurgence of protectionist drifts especially when 
Members use ingenious means to ensure sufficient flexibility through 
unilateral, bilateral or regional restrictive trade agreements. Such policies are 
erroneous and dangerous for several reasons; beyond the harm done to their 
own consumers in terms of price and innovation consequences, a significant 
part of national employment depends on access to export markets and that 
without trade, such jobs could be lost. This analysis affects both developed 
and developing countries. For Arab countries, hundreds of thousands of jobs 
would be directly or indirectly affected. Furthermore, can one imagine a 
country protecting its domestic market without other countries doing the 
same thing? In other words, the domino effect would be devastating. For 
example, if an Arab country decides to close its borders to foreign 
agricultural products, how to avoid that counterparts take retaliatory 
measures against banks and companies that operate in the country 
concerned? This is why isolationism, even "intelligent" isolationism as some 
argue, is a recipe for global recession. It is therefore imperative to resist the 
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temptation of protectionism and to strive to conclude the Doha Round by a 
fair and equitable agreement. 
 The second risk of failure in the Doha Round is the judicialization of 
international trade relations. The dispute settlement mechanism is the main 
institutional reform established by the WTO. The majority of observers 
legitimately consider today that the technical review of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB) is positive. During the period 1995-2012, 
nearly 900 requests for consultations, a mandatory first step of the procedure 
for settlement of disputes before the establishment of a panel in charge of 
reviewing a complaint, were filed before the DSB, among which about 50 % 
were terminated in a peaceful settlement after preliminary consultations. It is 
now unquestionable that the DSB has acquired credibility thanks to the 
reliability of its procedures and the effectiveness of its judgments. 
 Despite the credit acquired, the DSB intends, however, to remain the 
instrument of implementation of international norms and standards adopted 
by the Members in the multilateral negotiations. It is therefore a judicial 
extension of the "quasi-legislative" activity of the WTO. This institution is 
primarily a political forum with the purpose to govern, peacefully, tensions 
that arise between states involved in international trade. If the Doha 
negotiations were bogged down, an alternative would be for dominant States 
to alter the first mission of the DSB and to increasingly use litigation ways to 
settle their trade disputes. As a result, such a development can feed the 
temptation of Members to get rid of the system by denouncing a 
"government of judges." 
 The third danger of a Doha Round failure would be the trivialization 
of the multilateral approach to negotiations and commitments within the 
WTO. With the constraints of the “rule of consensus”, a mitigated 
multilateral approach would be particularly suitable since the WTO 
agreements already provide for several elements of “variable geometry”. In 
addition, such a path already exists informally in the works organized within 
the negotiating committees. The plurilateral approach would thus favor the 
experimentation of new concessions which would not be adopted by a WTO 
general and binding agreement because of the multiplicity and heterogeneity 
of Members. It would broaden the subject matters in negotiation by making 
it easier to conclude a final agreement. At the same time, it would allow 
countries that have not participated in the initial negotiations to join them at 
a late date, at their own pace and according to their commercial interests and 
development priorities. 
 Nevertheless, the systematic use of commitments based on limited 
participation implies the risk of fragmentation and complexity of the MTS. 
Moreover, general benefits are far from being guaranteed since the 
establishment of two or more categories of WTO Members in any form 
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whatsoever does not necessarily increase the reach of WTO nor deepen the 
commitments undertaken by Members in terms of liberalization. 
 To illustrate, the analysis of WTO agreements on government 
procurement and trade in civil aircrafts since their entry into force, 
respectively on January 1996 and January 1980, demonstrate the absence of 
developing countries and the low number of countries that joined the 
Member States originally bound by these agreements. The situation of Arab 
countries clearly confirms this reality. 
 A fourth danger that would result from a failure of the multilateral 
negotiations would be the spread of unilateralism in trade relations. 
Preferential trade agreements (hereinafter PTAs) proliferated in recent years 
and a failure of the multilateral negotiations would bring more states to fall 
back on this alternative. Until December 31, 2012, nearly 414 PTAs have 
been notified to the WTO, 235 of which are currently in force. Among these 
agreements, free trade agreements and partial scope agreements account for 
over 90 % and the customs union less than 10%. Most PTAs are bilateral, 
which creates a set of increasingly complex trade regulations and, in 
addition, undermines the principle of non–discrimination. Their defenders 
consider, however, that they may be the basis for future multilateral trade 
rules. Whatever the position adopted, there is no doubt that the WTO is 
increasingly challenged by the regional or bilateral rules. 
 Should the conclusion of the Doha Round prove to be impossible and 
multilateralism give way to regionalism and bilateralism, the global trading 
system would fall on two formidable obstacles: first, the opacity caused by 
the superposition of international trade agreements and their specifics, and 
second, the increased risk of trade discrimination and trade oligopoly of the 
strongest nations since, in such settings, developed countries can require an 
opening of foreign markets without risking access of foreign products and 
services from weakly competitive countries into their domestic markets. 
Also, and since trade liberalization through bilateral free trade agreements 
often goes well beyond what is provided within the multilateral framework 
of the WTO, and without consideration of special and differential treatment 
for weaker economies, the benefits of trade will be largely in favor of the 
more developed nations. In brief, the PTAs would actually be a disguised 
unilateralism. 
 For Arab countries, the incessant need for a credible alternative to 
regionalization or bi-lateralization of trade relations also results from the 
failed regional integration over the last several decades. There are currently 
two main legal frameworks within which intra-Arab trade operates: bilateral 
agreements and the three following regional agreements; the Common 
Market of the Gulf; the Agadir Agreement; and the Greater Arab Free Trade 
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Area (hereinafter GAFTA). Beyond the features of each of them, these three 
agreements have the following common economic objectives: 
- Boosting trade between the Signatories (which remains 
very low   ̶   less than 10% of the total trade of Arab countries) 
by emphasizing the complementarity of their economies (e.g., 
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt could export textiles and 
agricultural products to the Gulf countries, Algeria or Libya) 
and fighting counterfeit products that causes damages to local 
production and distorts the balance of payments. 
- Creating conditions to attract more foreign direct 
investments. 
- Strengthening the negotiation skills of the Member 
countries to deal with powerful trading blocs such as the USA 
or the EU or in international frameworks such as the WTO. 
 Despite these ambitious objectives, the implementation of the above-
mentioned agreements had rather negative results, quasi-similar to that of 
bilateral free trade agreements signed by the Arab states. Commitments to 
liberalize trade and make more transparent the internal regulations have no 
practical effect. To delay the enactment of their commitments, the 
Signatories claim that full implementation would mean the death of multiple 
economic sectors, especially the agricultural and food sectors, given the 
domestic price support policy adopted by some Signatories. 
 In fact, the reasons of this situation are numerous and varied. For one, 
these agreements were signed without serious preparatory steps or 
consultation of citizens and businesses so that inconsistencies have emerged 
over time. In contrast to the agreements signed with the United States or the 
EU, the private sector has not been involved in the preparation of the WTO 
negotiations. Consequently, it is not surprising that companies regularly 
denounce the maintenance of many export barriers including rules of origin 
which are interpreted differently in each country, as well as administrative 
and normative non-tariff barriers. 
 Furthermore, some Arab countries, on the basis of the pressure 
exerted by their farmers and industry, seek to establish a list of sensitive 
products (wheat, flour, sugar ...) that should be excluded from the scope of a 
multilateral agreement. Beyond these technical aspects, barriers to the 
development of regional economic cooperation also result from the priority 
given to political considerations over economic policies, and the weakness of 
regional institutions as reflected by the absence of dissuasive sanctions 
against a violation of the commitments and the adoption of the principle of 
unanimity, which makes it practically impossible to reach a common 
decision between Arab leaders, whose disunions remain outstanding beyond 
the repeated speeches on a virtual Arab unity. 
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The low impact of arab countries on the doha round 
 While Arab leaders repeat their support for the Doha negotiations 
process, it is clear, however, that their impact on the progress of these 
negotiations remains negligible. The reasons of this situation come less from 
a lack of political will than from the shortcomings of the WTO and 
difficulties of integration of developing countries in the MTS. Some 
observers regularly highlight the undemocratic and unequitable features of 
the multilateral negotiations (a), the ineffectiveness of programs of building 
trade capacity for developing countries (b) and, more broadly, questioning 
the founding theories of the MTS as governed by the WTO rules (c). 
 
a. The shortcomings of the multilateral trade negotiations 
 Developing countries require a greater role in the determination of 
both the content and the conduct of the multilateral negotiations. As for 
many developing countries, the Doha Round has shown the marginalization 
of Arab countries and their inability to claim their demands. 
 The WTO is a permanent and institutionalized negotiations forum 
between Member States. Negotiations taking place under its auspices must 
be conducted on the basis of reciprocity or non-reciprocity with regard to 
developing countries, as well as the equal treatment of participants, while the 
negotiated concessions are legally binding and have a minimal degree of 
stability in the time before they can be optionally modified. In practice, the 
implementation of the common principles governing the negotiations, 
however, favored the inertia of the Arab countries and made more difficult 
an ambitious consensus. 
 The situation of Arab countries is seriously complicated by their 
outright exclusion from the negotiations. These countries feel marginalized 
while these negotiations are in principle open to all WTO Members and 
Observers governments that are negotiating their accession or in progress of 
accession, which concerns about twenty Arab states. 
 Despite a massive membership of South’s countries in the WTO and 
a formally democratic structure, the negotiation process remains in fact 
controlled by the industrialized countries. These countries have even shown 
that they are willing to negotiate outside the WTO, in order to circumvent the 
principle of decision by consensus. With the support of some emerging 
countries, the industrialized countries seek to "force the destiny" by 
negotiating in the "green rooms", that are small circles bringing together a 
reduced number of major economic nations. Highlighting the impossibility 
of making decisions at a consensus of 159 countries, the main economic 
actors hold the decision-making power. Some developing countries do not 
wish to change this state of affairs: it is the case of major developing 
countries such as India, Brazil, Argentina and other emerging countries. But 
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one should keep in mind that these countries are part of the small circle of 
privileged nations that composes the green rooms. 
 In the context described above, it is not surprising to notice repeated 
failures of the trade negotiations organized under the auspices of a WTO that 
is not fully democratic and does not comply with the Doha ministerial 
declaration. For many developing countries, they cannot negotiate within the 
WTO as they negotiated under the GATT. Under the former system, the 
negotiation was between rich countries and the results were ratified by all 
parties, without prior discussion. This process was perhaps acceptable when 
the Contracting Parties could choose their commitments, but that can no 
longer be tolerated in the WTO system that is burdensome for poor countries 
due to the “single undertaking” principle. In consequence, these countries do 
not hesitate to wield their veto, and, at the same time, to integrate states 
coalitions within the WTO. 
 Arab states are aware of this reality and are eager to avoid isolation, 
which can mean loss of control over the negotiations. They tried, in 2006, to 
form their own coalition. But conflicts and political rivalries have impeded 
the success of this project. Meanwhile, these states are dispatched in several 
coalitions of states in which they do not have an active role nor a sufficient 
knowledge of the subject-matter in negotiation. It is thus striking that no 
communication has been made to date by an Arab country on behalf of a 
coalition. 
 To conclude on this point, it should be noted that the strengthening of 
Arab countries’ impact in current and future WTO negotiations is therefore a 
crucial issue; a significant development in this case will require both a more 
harmonized approach between Arab countries and an institutional 
framework, instead of the informal committees of negotiation called “green 
rooms" in which a limited number of developed and emerging countries 
address key trade issues. 
 
b. The inefficiency of the trade capacity building programs 
 While previous developments have highlighted the shortcomings of 
the negotiation process within the WTO, the low impact of the Arab 
countries on the work of the Negotiating Committees is also due to their lack 
of expertise in the field of international trade and the weak role played by the 
Arab delegations in the WTO bodies. This situation recalls the recurring 
questions about the effectiveness of the instruments established by the WTO 
regarding technical cooperation and training that did not fully respond to the 
needs of Arab countries in this field. An analysis of these different issues is 
required.  
 First, regarding the lack of expertise of Arab States, several 
indications highlight their poor knowledge of WTO rules. The first 
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indication is the lack of use of multilateral trade defense rules. For memory, 
these rules are used in case of difficulties due to trade liberalization. They 
ensure the defense of the legitimate commercial interests of WTO Members 
when they are victims of unfair practices or are forced to adopt emergency 
measures in the event of market disruption. Only three countries, namely 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, have already opened investigations at the 
request of their domestic industries for the application of safeguard measures 
by other governments. No Arab country has, to date, imposed a safeguard 
measure on imported products. In the same course, Egypt is the only Arab 
country to have initiated and imposed anti-dumping measures. 
 The application of trade defense rules is obviously essential for the 
competitiveness of Arab economies. In this regard, the annual reports of the 
WTO show that if 63 WTO members have participated in the dispute 
settlement procedure during the period 1995-2012, no Arab country has 
initiated proceedings before a panel as a complainant. Only Egypt was 
involved four times as defendant. This country and also Saudi Arabia are 
also the only ones involved in the WTO dispute settlement procedures as 
third parties, thereby recalling the considerable interest that Arab countries 
may have in the context of WTO litigations. 
 How is it possible to justify this inertia of the Arab countries? 
 The absence of Arab countries in the dispute settlement system 
(hereinafter DSS) may indicate that these countries chose to settle their 
disputes by peaceful means. But it is difficult to justify that no "request for 
consultations" has been filed by an Arab country in 2012! The reasons 
clearly are elsewhere. A number of experts justify this situation by the high 
cost of litigations initiated under the DSS which is an obstacle for many 
Arab countries, but also by the fear of reprisals and adverse consequences on 
the financial assistance provided by developed and emerging countries. It is 
striking nonetheless that some countries like Guatemala, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan or Colombia adopt a more offensive position in the DSS. The lack 
of participation in the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO may also be 
attributed to the low contribution of Arab countries in world trade. Here 
again, this argument should be moderated since it is sufficient to recall the 
low share held by some active countries such as Argentina (0.6% of world 
trade) or India (1.5% of world trade), as well as the other countries 
mentioned above. 
 In any event, the reasons given above cannot overlook the fact that 
the infrequent use of the DSS by Arab states is, first, the result of their lack 
of expertise and knowledge of WTO rules and that this situation is 
exacerbated by the increasing complexity of commercial disputes. Bringing 
an action before a WTO panel is a long process that requires the preparation 
of legal and business data which cannot be provided by the other Member or 
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the WTO Secretariat. A State Member must find other sources of relevant 
information by using legal experts and economists who can provide 
consultations and econometric studies supported by substantial 
documentation. However, Arab countries have a severe lack of experts in 
these areas. Is it necessary to recall that, notwithstanding the provisions of 
Article 17.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (hereinafter DSU) by 
which the Appellate Body shall be broadly representative of WTO Members, 
only two Arab experts have integrated this entity since 1995! 
 This situation may be explained by the delay of Arab governments 
and universities to incorporate into their training programs issues related to 
international trade. But it is impossible not to question the effectiveness of 
the "progressive learning strategy" and the "reference centers" that constitute 
the two vertebral columns of the trade-related technical assistance program 
for developing countries. Managed by the WTO Secretariat, and more 
particularly by the Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation 
(hereinafter ITTC), this program focuses on e-learning courses and academic 
programs and workshops organized at both national and regional levels. The 
immediate objective of these activities is to enable participants to understand 
the fundamental principles of the WTO in relation to the matters dealt with. 
For specific questions in connection with the Doha Round, the goal is to give 
participants the factual and analytical information required to participate 
meaningfully in the negotiations. 
 Even if the training tools have been continuously improved since the 
creation of the WTO, their added value for the Arab States remains however 
limited. The latest annual report issued by the WTO is eloquent. During 
2012, the WTO has undertaken 343 technical assistance activities related to 
trade capacity building and most of which were for officials from developing 
countries and LDCs. But the analysis by region shows that only 5% of those 
activities concerned Arab states, ranking this region almost at the last 
position with the Caribbean area which received 3% of the technical 
assistance activities. 
 There is no doubt that the small number of technical cooperation and 
training activities does not increase the level of expertise in the Arab 
countries in the field of international trade, nor target the needs of these 
countries in the implementation of the WTO Agreements and the Doha 
Round negotiations. The dramatic situation of Arab countries requires more 
than a few weeks of training or seminars on specific issues of international 
economic law. It requires more regular training and monitoring mechanisms 
for Arab officials selected on skills and stability criteria, as well as more 
intense awareness policies for businesses, parliamentarians and decision-
makers in these countries. 
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 Low expertise of Arab countries in the field of international trade 
also has a negative impact on their representation within the WTO bodies 
and in the process of multilateral negotiations. Coordinator of the WTO 
activities, the Secretariat has 639 regular staff selected from 77 WTO 
Members. Among the staff, there are only 18 experts coming from four Arab 
countries, which constitutes less than 3% of the total staff. 
 In addition to the lack of representation in the WTO Secretariat, Arab 
countries do not have powerful and effective delegations that are able to 
negotiate. Limited human and financial resources constitute a major obstacle 
to the full participation of Arab countries in the WTO works. On the ground, 
the diplomatic representatives of Arab countries are limited to one or a 
handful of officials. In addition, their delegations not only cover the WTO 
works, but participate in the works of other international organizations also 
based in Geneva, such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
(UNCTAD, WIPO, etc.). With its staff of ten members and a participation in 
all ministerial and other meetings held in Geneva, Egypt is an exception 
among Arab countries in this case. 
 In brief, while the Doha Ministerial Declaration emphasizes that 
"technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements of the 
development dimension of the multilateral trading system" (parag.38), 
multilateral negotiations have highlighted the marginalization of Arab 
countries in the functioning of the WTO. The challenge for these countries in 
the context of current and future negotiations is to train more national experts 
in international trade issues and to set up teams of skilled and polyvalent 
negotiators likely to actively participate in workshops and influence the 
outcome of negotiations. Success however will also depend on the 
redefinition of the WTO technical cooperation strategy and a clarification of 
the Secretariat mandate in this area. 
 
c. The questioning of the WTO ideological foundations 
 Whatever the outcome of the Doha Round negotiations, the debate on 
the legitimacy of the WTO as a body regulator of world trade is recurrent in 
Arab countries. Since the early 2000s, a strong anti-globalization movement 
is running within Arab societies and affecting a growing number of 
stakeholders. This has been recently compounded by political instability 
related to the "Arab Spring" and a resurgence of religious conservatism. 
 These parameters reinforce the skepticism of Arab countries and 
partly explain their reluctance to participate actively in negotiations. To 
justify their positions, opponents to multilateralism point out that current 
tensions and deadlocks described above are justified by systemic and 
structural reasons that would require a renegotiation of the WTO Agreements 
and a rebalancing of rights and obligations imposed on Arab states. With a 
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closer look, some points of disagreement between WTO Members reflect, 
indeed, a real questioning of the founding theories of the global economic 
order established since 1945, and a fortiori of the WTO. 
 In effect, the Doha Round is occurring in a period of questioning of 
the theory of comparative advantages which is the cornerstone of the MTS. 
The principle of specialization is regularly advanced to convince the 
economically backward states to open their borders. However, the weak 
economic and industrial development of many Arab countries generates a 
low added value of the so-called "advantages" possessed by these countries. 
Like many developing countries, their market position is deteriorated 
because they export products at low prices, while they cannot do without 
numerous and costly imports. Their integration into the global economy is 
therefore reflected by a loss. Trade is largely in favor of industrialized 
countries, although some countries such as China or India contradict this 
reality. 
 Parallel to criticisms against the principle of specialization, the 
absence of automatic links between trade and development is more and more 
pointed out. Such a statement may seem surprising. According a World Bank 
study (Global Economic Prospect, 2004), the conclusion of a “good deal” at 
the WTO would have increased global income from 290 to 520 billion 
dollars annually and 144 million people would have come out of the state of 
poverty by 2015. The OECD went towards the same direction and 
emphasized that the dynamics of multilateral liberalization may lead to 
welfare gains, particularly in developing countries. 
 The argumentations still provided by these international 
organizations are not enough to convince WTO members to agree. The 
successive failures of ministerial conferences have revealed the particular 
crisis of confidence of the South in the MTS. This crisis of confidence is 
regularly fed by the questioning of the benefits of trade openness and the 
correlation between trade openness and growth rate of a country. The result, 
as highlighted by a report issued by the Commission on Human Rights of the 
UN, is that for certain groups WTO is seen as a "nightmare" (UN, J. Oloka-
Onyango and D. Udagama, La mondialisation et ses effets sur la pleine 
jouissance des droits de l’homme, 2000). 
 Naturally, it is impossible in this contribution to take a conclusive 
position in this debate. One may only indicate that the logic underlying many 
multilateral agreements such as the Agreement on agriculture and the TRIPS 
Agreement are indicative of the North’s attitude, which is far from the 
generosity displayed. Similarly, trade liberalization offers opportunities only 
under specific conditions that are far from being met in the Arab world: 
reciprocal liberalization, building capacities in terms of infrastructure and 
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administration, an educated and skilled population, political and 
macroeconomic stability, etc. 
 To better benefit from trade, Arab leaders must also assimilate the 
fact that trade policy may serve their needs of development when 
implemented in cooperation with the private sector and civil society. Beyond 
the official speeches, this requires a profound change in mindsets to end the 
priority given to political considerations in the conclusion of trade 
agreements while the opacity surrounding their socio-economic impact 
remains. The Doha Round thus constitutes an opportunity to increase 
transparency through greater involvement of private actors and national 
parliaments in determining objectives and benefits of trade concessions. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the above discussion suggests three main observations: 
 Firstly, the Doha Round is a major turning point in the integration of 
developing countries, and particularly the Arab countries, in the MTS. 
Multilateralism is currently viewed as the most suitable approach to support 
development policies in these countries, to fight against the abuses or 
excesses of bilateral trade agreements and to mitigate failures of regional 
integration. 
 Secondly, the Doha Round has highlighted the marginalization of 
Arab countries in the negotiation process and, more generally, in the MTS. 
This is due to a lack of competitiveness of their economies and serious 
technical problems of access to international markets, but also to the 
shortcomings of WTO, which does not fully meet their needs of integration. 
 Thirdly, Arab countries should better identify their goals in the 
negotiations and develop more active participation strategies in the MTS. In 
this respect, a crucial element is Arab unity: Their alliance of 2006 must be 
revitalized in order to provide a platform for articulating their interests and to 
be viewed as a strategic partner by powerful delegations in WTO 
negotiations. 
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